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This article sets out to demonstrate that considering Islamophobia as a form of racism prevents us from fully 
grasping the complexity of this phenomenon. The author contends that there are different types of 
Islamophobia and while some are racist, others are not. To argue this point, he draws on a conflict that was 
sparked within a Spanish extreme right party revolving around two different conceptions of the human 
being and society, one rooted in the völkisch tradition and the other in the Catholic tradition. By analysing 
the only book the leader of that party wrote, we see how these two conceptions engendered two different 
types of Islamophobia: one völkisch, the other Catholic. Both share the same vision of Islam as a vital 
"threat" to the "West", but they differ in their understanding of the foundations of the Muslim and 
European identities: racist versus religious perspectives. 
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Resumen 
En este artículo se trata de demostrar que considerar que la islamofobia es una forma de racismo impide 
comprender la complejidad del fenómeno. Se defiende que existen diferentes tipos de islamofobia y que 
algunos de ellos son racistas, pero que otros no lo son. Para ello, se mostrará que en el seno de un partido 
español de extrema derecha se produjo un conflicto entre dos concepciones diferentes del ser humano y de 
la sociedad, una procedente de la tradición völkisch y otra procedente de la tradición católica. Gracias al 
análisis del único libro que publicó el líder del partido, veremos que de esas dos concepciones se derivaban 
dos tipos diferentes de islamofobia: una völkisch y otra católica. Ambas compartían una misma visión del 
islam como una "amenaza" vital para "Occidente", pero diferían en cuanto a cómo entendían los 
fundamentos de la identidad musulmana y europea: una a partir de presupuestos raciales, la otra a partir 
de presupuestos religiosos. 
 







Introduction: Islamophobia and Racism1 
 
Just as the number of studies devoted to analysing Islamophobia has increased in recent years, so too the 
notion of Islamophobia as a form of racism has been gaining weight in academia. Indeed, this "seems to be 
the dominant interpretation at present" (Bagguley, 2013). The definition of this phenomenon in a well-
known international report on Islamophobia provides us with a typical example: "When talking about 
Islamophobia, we mean anti-Muslim racism" (Bayrakli & Hafez, 2016: 7, 2017: 8). 
 
This definition categorically identifies Islamophobia with racism, yet it does not explain why. It merely notes 
that this phenomenon does not necessarily spring from criticism of Muslims or of Islam, but is linked with 
power relations: how one group dominates another, in this case Muslims, turning them into scapegoats 
and excluding them from the "resources/rights/definition of a constructed 'we'". According to this 
definition, Islamophobia operates "by constructing a static 'Muslim' identity, which is attributed in negative 
terms and generalised for all Muslims". Finally, the report states that Islamophobia can vary in different 
contexts, although it does not specify what these variations consist of (Bayrakli & Hafez, 2016: 7, 2017: 8). 
 
Although the report’s definition of racism is somewhat vague, the idea that Muslims are excluded through 
the construction of a "static 'Muslim' identity" appears to refer to definitions of racism akin to those 
proposed by authors such as Fredrickson (2002: 170): "we might say that racism exists when one ethnic 
group or historical collectivity dominates, excludes, or seeks to eliminate another on the basis of 
differences that it believes are hereditary and unalterable"; or Wieviorka (2009: 13): "racism consists of 
characterizing a human grouping using natural attributes that are also associated with intellectual and 
moral features that can be applied to each individual related to that grouping and, on that basis, adopt 
certain practices of inferiorization and exclusion." As in the aforementioned report, both definitions 
emphasize two key aspects of racism: the construction of a difference based on forming a vision of the 
Other’s identity as natural, unalterable and hereditary, and using this difference to legitimize forms of 
dominance, exclusion, discrimination, persecution, etc. In step with Balibar’s suggestions (1991), the line 
between biological racism and cultural racism becomes more blurred as differentiation between the two 
becomes, if anything, rhetorical, insofar as all forms of racism naturalize cultural differences. Thus, the 
notion of "race" is replaced with the notion of "culture" in the public discourse, but the cultural 
characteristics of a human group are considered as stemming from a shared origin, thus making them 
innate and unchangeable (Fredrickson, 2002: 7-8, 145, 169-170; Wieviorka, 2009: 42-50; see also Miles & 
Brown, 2003: 103-104). 
 
The other authors who consider that Islamophobia is a form of racism draw on different notions of 
"racism". Some draw on definitions such as the preceding ones (Galonnier, 2015; Garner y Selod, 2015); 
others approach it from the prism of "cultural racism" (Alietti & Padovan, 2013; Modood, 1997; Dunn, 
Klocker y Salabay, 2007; Kumar, 2012: 3; Kundnani, 2014: chapter 2); others combine both perspectives 
(Grosfoguel, 2012; Grosfoguel & Mielants, 2006); others do not specify what they understand by racism or 
do so rather vaguely (Selod y Embrick, 2013; Selod, 2015); and others (Meer & Modood, 2009, 2010, 2012; 
Müller-Uri & Opratko, 2016; Rana, 2007; Tyrer, 2013: 33-36) still avail themselves of a definition so broad 
as to result in the "conceptual inflation" decried by authors like Rattansi (2007: 8), or Miles & Brown (2003: 
57-72). 
 
But irrespective of how they conceptualize racism, most authors invoke the notion of "racialization" to 
explain how a religious community –Muslims– can be the object of racism (Alietti & Padovan, 2013; Dunn, 
Klocker & Salabay, 2007; Galonnier, 2015; Garner & Selod, 2015; Grosfoguel, 2012; Grosfoguel & Mielants, 
                                                          
1
 This article is a reworking of pages 319-334 of my book En casa ajena: bases intelectuales del antisemitismo y la 
islamofobia (Bravo López, 2012). I would like to thank the reviewers of this paper and Puerto García Ortiz for their 
valuable comments, and Caroline Haslett for her translation. This work forms part of the project "Islamofobia: 
continuidad y cambio en la tradición antimusulmana: el caso de España [Islamophobia: continuity and change in the 
anti-Muslim tradition: the case of Spain]" (HAR2015-73869-JIN). 
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2006; Meer, 2013; Meer & Modood, 2009, 2010, 2012; Moosavi, 2014; Selod, 2015; Selod & Embrick, 2013; 
Rana, 2007; Tyrer, 2013). Although different perspectives have been adopted (see Miles & Brown, 2003: 
99-103), "racialization" is generally taken to mean the process of ascribing natural, unchangeable and 
hereditary characteristics to a human group that was not previously considered as a community in these 
terms. As Robert Miles puts it, racialization is "a process of delineation of group boundaries and of 
allocation of persons within those boundaries by primary reference to (supposedly) inherent and/or 
biological (usually phenotypical) characteristics" (cit. in Miles & Brown, 2003: 100). What we are dealing 
with, then, is a process whereby a voluntary religious identity has been transformed into an  involuntary 
"racial" identity (Meer, 2008).  
 
A number of factors account for this. Firstly, the increasingly numerous Muslim presence in the "West" and 
the ever-increasing visibility of Islam in these societies (Allievi, 2006, 2012). Secondly, the growing need to 
identify the "Islamic threat" apace with growing fear of Islam in these so-called "Western" societies, 
particularly since 9/11. Hence the need to identify the "danger" and find answers to the questions "who are 
Muslims?" and "where are they?” –  especially for the security services (Cesari, 2010; Fekete, 2009: 43-73; 
Hussain & Bagguley, 2012; Rana, 2007). 
 
But since a person’s faith is invisible, other non-religious criteria have gradually taken precedence when 
identifying Muslims. Invariably ethno-cultural, these criteria encompass somatic features, national origin, 
names and surnames, ways of dressing and certain visible cultural habits. In practice, then, Muslims are not 
being identified on the basis of their faith but rather their supposed ethno-cultural origins, ultimately being 
distinguished by descent. An identity that was therefore initially determined on the basis of beliefs has 
become naturalized and ultimately determined on the basis of biological origin, descent. The implications 
are clear: the religious identity can be cast aside insofar as people can stop believing in what they believe; 
descent, on the other hand, is hereditary, perennial and cannot therefore be changed. 
 
In this sense, then, determinism is a key factor in terms of how the Muslim identity is constructed: origin 
conclusively determines a person’s identification with Islam, and, by extension, what that person is like and 
how he or she thinks and acts. How they are in terms of belief and behaviour is determined by who they 
are by descent, something they cannot change. If, moreover, a number of contemptible and threatening 
characteristics are associated with this inalterable identity for the purpose of legitimizing forms of 
exclusion, discrimination, persecution, etc., then we are dealing with a form of racism. 
 
Everything would appear to indicate that this is indeed what has taken place in the so-called "Western 
world". Yet it is not enough to justify claims that Islamophobia is always a form of racism. Just because this 
kind of anti-Muslim rejection exists, it does not follow that all forms of anti-Muslim rejection fit the same 
mould. There is no evidence to uphold the theory that all forms of anti-Muslim rejection that can be 
considered Islamophobic amount to racism, not by a long chalk. 
 
If we were to concede that Islamophobia is always a form of racism, but were to encounter other forms of 
anti-Muslim rejection that do not view the Muslim identity as "static" (Bayrakli & Hafez, 2016: 7, 2017: 8), 
"hereditary and unalterable" (Fredrickson, 2002: 170), or based on "natural attributes" (Wieviorka, 2009: 
13), linking it instead solely with individual religious beliefs and therefore as something that can be 
relinquished, we would have to conclude that these other forms of anti-Muslim rejection do not qualify as 
racism. As Fredrickson himself says (2002: 170): "If conversion or assimilation is a real possibility, we have 
religious or cultural intolerance but not racism". In other words, for racism to exist the potential inclusion 
of the Other must be denied (Wieviorka, 2009: 45). But if, as so many authors argue, Islamophobia is a form 
of racism and these forms of anti-Muslim rejection are not, because they accept the possibility of inclusion, 
we would have to conclude that they do not amount to Islamophobia, however radically anti-Muslim they 
are. These would be more akin to religious intolerance rather than racism in any form, and could not 






Indeed, some academics tend to categorically reject the notion that Islamophobia can occasionally also 
amount to a form of religious intolerance, to the point of arguing that "to reduce it to the banal question of 
religion" is a means of obviating its importance —or even its very existence— and relegating it to a simple 
matter of religious criticism (Tyrer, 2013: 5). Clearly, however, legitimate criticism of religion and religious 
intolerance are two completely different issues. It is one thing to contend that Muslims are wrong and 
altogether something else to contend that Muslims are a vital threat. Criticism of the Islamic religion is 
legitimate as long as it does not degenerate into demonization and a way of legitimizing discrimination, 
exclusion and even persecution of Muslims. Claims that the Islamic religion represents a vital threat to "us" 
and that Muslims, the incarnation of this religion, are also a threat and must therefore be subject to a 
series of measures viewed as "self-defence" (Fallaci, 2005b, 2005c), do not amount simply to criticism of 
Islam, but to the construction of an image of the enemy with the aim of legitimizing measures designed to 
forestall the danger it allegedly represents (see Bravo López 2011, 2016). Even if based on strictly religious 
and non-racial considerations, the consequences of this ideological construction are not "banal" at all. 
Proposing measures of "self-defence" —subjecting Muslims to special surveillance measures, excluding 
them from certain public spheres, forbidding them from entering the country, expulsion or worse— on the 
grounds that the faith they follow is considered threatening, has huge political and social ramifications, 
despite being underpinned by strictly religious criteria. This attitude undermines rights and freedoms that 
are part and parcel of democracy and human rights such as freedom of conscience, worship, association 
and expression. This kind of approach has even led to occasional calls for the Koran or Islam in general to 
be banned, pure and simple (Pipes, 2007). Racism is not the root of all evil. Other evils pose a threat to 
democracy and human rights. Religious intolerance is not the least of them, not by any means (Nussbaum, 
2012). 
 
This other type of anti-Muslim sentiment, which can be strictly religious and non-racist, is to be found 
particularly —but not exclusively— in certain Christian religious movements (Kidd, 2009a, 2009b; 
Robertson, 2011). Despite its radical anti-Muslim thrust, many of those who feel this way are prepared to 
concede that the Muslim identity depends on individual faith and is therefore something that can be 
relinquished. They accept conversion to Christianity as an option and as a means of eradicating the 
contemptible and threatening characteristics of the Muslim who becomes Christian (Goodstein, 2003; 
Smith, 2014). So, while Muslims who stop being Muslims are welcomed as "born again", irrespective of 
their "racial origin", those who remain true to their faith are perceived with the same violent animosity. 
This type of anti-Muslim sentiment sometimes encompasses the worst conceivable vision of Islam and 
Muslims in that it identifies them with absolute evil, with the Antichrist (see, for example, Back & Back, 
2007; Jones, 2010; Richardson, 2006, 2009; Smith, 2011).2 
 
And yet, as noted earlier, the rationale of the dominant tendency in studies of Islamophobia would lead us 
to conclude that this form of anti-Muslim rejection does not amount to Islamophobia, because it is not 
strictly racist since it does not consider the Muslim identity as static, but rather as something that can be 
changed and relinquished. 
 
We would venture the hypothesis that this insistence on considering Islamophobia always as a form of 
racism may well spring from the Anglo-Saxon preoccupation with "Race Relations", as a direct result of the 
central role ascribed to "race" in British anti-discrimination legislation. As is widely known, the 1965 and 
1976 Race Relations Acts did not protect Muslims against discrimination, unlike Jews and Sikhs, who were 
considered as "ethnic" communities and therefore afforded protection. Muslims were considered as a 
religious community and were not protected as such, although they were as Asians, Africans, Arabs or 
Persians. In other words, any discrimination on religious grounds could not be legally pursued (Allen, 2010: 
8-10; Fetzer & Soper, 2004: 30-32; Modood, 2003; Vertovec, 2002; Weller, 2006). This may well explain  
 
                                                          
2
 There is also a secularized version of this vision which postulates that the only remedy to the evils of Islam is for 
Muslims to stop being Muslims, or to "reform" by adopting republican or liberal values (see Bravo López, 2012: 247-
266). 
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why concerned activists and academics tried to right the balance by arguing that Muslims were being 
racialized: that while not a race —none of these "races" is really a race— they were being treated as such, 
and should therefore receive the same legal treatment as Jews, Sikhs, etc. (see, for example, Modood, 
2003; Meer 2008; Meer & Modood, 2009, 2010, 2012). So, rather than seeking to make discrimination on  
 
religious grounds also pursuable by law —because it infringes on freedom of conscience— attempts were 
being made to integrate Muslims qua Muslims in the Race Relations system by confounding the concepts of 
Islamophobia and racism. 
 
At the heart of some of these approaches, there appears to be an underlying fear that the law cannot 
appropriately pursue manifestations of open hostility towards Islam and Muslims because these are not 
being recognized as forms of racism (see, for example, Tyrer, 2013: 24-26, 31). If so, it is understandable 
that some activists and academics, in a bid to seek legal protection for Muslims against discrimination, 
opted for this action strategy of labelling Islamophobia as a form of racism. On balance, though, their 
strategy has contributed more to obscuring rather than shedding light not only on the phenomenon of 
Islamophobia, but racism too. 
 
Although the Racial and Religious Hatred Bill of 2005 began to change the way the law protected Muslims 
against discrimination in the United Kingdom, by then the tendency to consider Islamophobia as racism 
appeared too well entrenched to resist change. Thereafter the hegemony of Anglo-Saxon academia 
worldwide led to a globalization of this perspective. Which brings us to where we are today, with the 
notion of Islamophobia as a form of racism being the mainstream tendency. 
 
But this does not mean to say it is the only tendency, or, of course, that this is the most accurate approach. 
There have always been authors who have defended different views, views that tend to differentiate 
between Islamophobia and racism. Without denying that racist Islamophobia exists, they believe that other 
types of Islamophobia can also exist. Miles & Brown (2003: 164) stated that "Islamophobia is not to be 
regarded as an instance of racism", while at the same time conceding that "it does interact with racism". 
Even Tariq Modood, who has gone out of his way to achieve recognition of Islamophobia as a form of 
racism or cultural racism, conceded —at least until 2005— that there was a difference between "religious 
Islamophobia" —an attitude he identified with the U.S. Christian right—  and "anti-Muslim racism" 
(Modood, 2005: 122). Ali Rattansi (2007: 111) too has argued that "'Islamophobia' or any other kind of 
hostility to Islam and Muslims is not necessarily racist, but in many contexts can take a relatively 'strong' or 
'hard' racist form". Along the same lines, Sindre Bangstad (2015) stated that "It should be clear that not all 
forms of Islamophobia qualify as racist", although it is true that there are "racist hard forms" this 
phenomenon (Bangstad, 2016). 
 
Sure enough, there is a clear difference between the affirmations of Spanish columnist José García 
Dominguez (2005) —"Ten percent of all those born each year in EU territory will be slaves of Islam for the 
rest of their lives"— and those of Robert Spencer and Daniel Ali (2003) —"Does it really matter whether or 
not they [i.e. the Muslims] are introduced to Christianity? Yes, it most emphatically does"—. Indeed, this 
difference is one that any definition of Islamophobia should seriously consider. The first statement 
embodies a clearly racist conception of the Islamic identity, suffused with biological determinism; the 
second, a religious conception where determinism is absent. Both are hostile towards Islam and Muslims, 
but they conceive of the Muslim identity differently: for García Dominguez, it depends on birth and cannot 
be abandoned; for Spencer and Ali, it depends on beliefs and can be abandoned. Confounding these two 
different forms of Islamophobia as forms of racism, as if they were the same, is to distort the phenomenon. 
 
Identifying Islamophobia with racism precludes an understanding of the complexity of this phenomenon in 
all its magnitude. More specifically, however, it also precludes any proper understanding of the conflicting 





Islamophobic movements, owing to the internal differences that exist between the different ways of 
understanding what forms the basis of the Muslim and European identities. 
 
To illustrate the limitations of interpreting Islamophobia as racism and to illustrate this last point, this study 
analyses one of these conflicts, highlighting the differences that have existed in the bosom of a certain 
Spanish extreme right Islamophobic movement, between those with visions closer to the Catholic tradition 
and those who identified more with the neo-pagan stand of völkisch nationalism.3 This conflict did not only 
arise among people with different Islamophobic perceptions, but, surprisingly, is manifest in the main work 
published by the leader of this movement. 
 
We can surmise that the book in question was assembled by people with these very same differences of 
opinion, with the resulting contradictions that appear throughout. Although the same image of lslam and 
Muslims as a vital threat to Europe is conveyed throughout the book, there is a basic clash of ideas 
concerning the foundations —ethnic or religious— of the Muslim and European identities.  
 
This paper defends the premise that if these two different perceptions shared a same image of Islam and 
Muslims, then both should be construed as Islamophobia. But, since they differed in their understanding of 
the foundations of the Muslim identity —one drawing on religious and the other on "racial" criteria— the 
former should be construed as religious Islamophobia —in this case, Catholic— and the latter as racist or 
völkisch Islamophobia. 
                                                                 
This paper will go on to present the case of "Plataforma per Cataluña" (PxC), one of the Spanish extreme 
right political parties that reaped the biggest local election victories in 2011, before its internal crisis took 
root. We will examine how the aforementioned clash between Catholic and völkisch perceptions 
materialized in stark relief within PxC, ultimately sparking an internal breakdown. This will be followed by 
an in-depth analysis of the aforementioned book, with the aim of showing what its blueprint for society 
consisted of, the image of Islam and Muslims it transmitted, and, finally, how it juggled with two 
contradictory visions of European and Muslim identities. We will therefore see that a same vision of Islam, 
mixed with two different forms of understanding the Muslim identity engendered two different and 
contradictory forms of Islamophobia, one Catholic and one völkisch. 
 
This work will therefore serve to show that a more open conception of Islamophobia —as a hostile attitude 
towards Islam and Muslims, based on the belief that Islam is a threat to "our" wellbeing, and even "our" 
very survival, an attitude that can therefore manage different conceptions of the Muslim identity (Bravo 
López, 2011, 2016)— will enhance our understanding of this phenomenon and its social and political 
consequences, its different manifestations, and the contradictions and conflicts between them. 
 
 
The Valkyries versus the Virgin of Montserrat 
 
Despite his Francoist past as a former member of Fuerza Nueva, Josep Anglada (Vic, Catalonia, 1959), 
managed over a period of several years to carve out an important niche for himself in Catalan politics. For a 
while, he even managed to transform his party, Plataforma per Cataluña (PxC) into the extreme right party 
with the broadest institutional presence in Spain (Casals, 2009; Hernández-Carr, 2011; Guedioura, 2012). In 
the 2010 Catalan parliamentary elections, PxC reaped 75,000 votes even though it did not obtain a seat in 
parliament. In the local elections a year later, the party increased its presence in Catalonia’s institutions, 
obtaining a total of 67 councillors. In the Vic municipality, it became the second largest political force with 
five town councillors. Councillors were also elected in areas such as El Vendrell (5), Santa Coloma de 
Gramenet (3), Salt (3) and Manlleu (3).4 After this major success, a serious internal crisis took root in PxC,  
 
                                                          
3
 I use the expression "völkisch nationalism" rather than other expressions such as "national-populism" or "ethnic 
nationalism" to highlight its identification with the tradition of ethnic German nationalism. 
4
 Source: Ministry of nterior: http://elecciones.mir.es/resultados2011/ [accessed 10 April 2017]. 
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leading to Anglada being sacked as leader and expelled from the party, which finally took a severe 
thrashing in the polls in 2015 (Roger, 2015). Despite this, Anglada still represents a particularly interesting  
case in terms of examining how Spain’s extreme right has used Islamophobia as a vehicle for its political 
normalization and as a tool for engendering broader social support. 
 
It was in the context of the electoral success of PxC in 2010 that its leader decided to publish the book Sin 
mordaza y sin velos (No gag and no veils), supposedly written by Anglada himself, as an attempt to 
establish his party beyond the confines of Catalonia. The PxC leader cashed in on the presentation of his  
 
book in Madrid in October 2010 to say that he intended to expel the Muslims from Spain —"It’s going to be 
up to us brave souls to expel the Muslims from our country"— and to express his conviction that a Muslim 
could never be Spanish or Catalan: "a Moor can become a Catalan just because he can speak our language…  
I’ll have none of that. Once a Muslim always a Muslim!" (Hidalgo, 2010).5 
 
It is strange that Anglada expressed himself so clearly in public, speaking to the media, considering that 
these ideas are not enunciated half as forcefully in the book he supposedly wrote. The language and 
manner contained in the book differ greatly from the language and manners he tended to use in his public 
appearances. Whereas Anglada was given to speaking with the aim of working his audience up, his writing 
was more explicitly designed to convince his readers, which is why his ideas are expressed with a greater 
degree of sophistication than he would employ during his public addresses. This is one of the reasons why 
the authorship of the book was called into question from the outset. Spanish extreme right expert Xavier 
Casals (2010), for example, contends that the book displays "a certain patchwork or collage of elements", 
which would appear to indicate the work of several hands. 
 
The book is interspersed with at least two different lines of thought, which is perhaps what paved the way 
for the breakup of PxC at the end of 2010. At the heart of the rupture were Enrique de Diego —who had 
moved closer to Anglada over the years— and Enrique Ravello, then the party’s secretary for international 
relations6. De Diego is a journalist and regular guest on various ultra-conservative television channels, and 
also the founder of the Rambla publishing house that published Anglada’s book as well as several books by 
de Diego himself devoted to warning the public about the "Islamic threat" (Diego, 2010a, 2010b). It is 
possible that de Diego was behind several sections of Anglada’s book, especially the last one devoted to 
Islam and heavily influenced by the Catholic anti-Islamic tradition. Ravello, on the other hand, leans 
towards the premises of the neopagan völkisch nationalism of publications such as Tierra y Pueblo [Soil and 
People] and Europae, where he was chief editor. Ravello may well have penned the parts of the book 
devoted to "identity populism". Inevitably, however, there was a conflict between these two positions, one 
that smacks of the conflict that drove a rift in the anti-Semite movements at the end of the nineteenth 
century, pitting defenders of racist nationalism against those who remained loyal to the Christian tradition 
(see Tal, 2004: 171-190; Zimmermann, 1986: esp. 82-83, 91-92). 
 
Indeed, this conflict still exists within Europe’s extreme right, as evidenced by de Diego’s distancing from 
PxC. De Diego himself said that his split from the party was due to the neopagan ideas spouted by Ravello, 
who "entertains outlandish and hallucinatory ideas about a pagan and Naziphile identity of Valkyries, 
nibelungs, Celtic crosses and forest gnomes, which have nothing to do with the Catalan narrative, with  
                                                          
5
 He would express similar opinions in an interview: "Un moro nunca será español" [A Moor can never be Spanish], El 
Mundo, 26 May 2011, see http://medios.mugak.eu/noticias/noticia/283029 [accessed 10 April 2017]. 
6
 In 2014 the party took disciplinary action against Enrique Ravello as a result of his clearly favourable stand towards 
Catalan independence. Eventually he resigned. See "PxC abre un expediente a Enrique Ravello… y el secretario 
internacional deja el partido", Mediterráneo Digital, 3 February 2014, 
http://www.mediterraneodigital.com/identitarios/seccion-identitarios/identitarios-3/pxc-abre-un-expediente-a-





none of Catalonia’s Christian roots, not by a long shot, and clearly hostile towards Montserrat, Ripoll and 
Poblet, towards Wifredo el Velloso, Ramón Berenguer and James I 'The Conqueror'" (Diego, 2010c). At the 
end of the day, Christianity ill accords with a system of thinking based on the notion that the only cultural 
products acceptable to a people are those it generates itself "spontaneously". Christianity, as a religion that 
was imported to Europe, was an oddity for an extreme right that is preaching a return to its "authentic" 
pagan origins.  
 
In the second half of the nineteenth and early twentieth century, the racist extreme right came up against 
the same problem, with some of those who remained loyal to the Christian world view going out of their 
way to integrate Christianity as an essential element of Europeanness, Germanness and Aryanness. They 
even went as far as "Aryanizing" Christ (Heschel, 2008). A similar problem arose in Anglada’s book, a 
problem that was addressed by incorporating Christianity as part of a culture generated spontaneously, 
with no external influences, by the peoples of Europe. But this obviously clashes with Christian tradition, 
and creates a contradiction that permeates the whole book, and that is manifested also, and specially, in 




Völkisch nationalism against "Islamization" 
 
All the elements of the Islamophobic discourse are present in Sin mordaza y sin velos, coupled with the key 
elements of the extreme right’s discourse. The book’s message is almost the same as the message 
conveyed by authors such as Fallaci, Spencer and Fjordman: Europe is decadent. Stripped of values, without 
hope, unaware of its identity and culture, besieged by foreign influences and by hordes of immigrants, it 
runs the risk of disappearing altogether. Particularly when the enemy confronting it, the enemy threatening 
it and invading it, is Islam, quintessentially the antithesis of Europe, its most absolute negation. Viewed 
from this perspective, Islam is the eternal enemy of a Europe that has built itself historically on the basis of 
its ongoing fight against Islam. Europe’s struggle against Islam is therefore what has made it what it is. This 
is what defines it. If Europe were to lose its anti-Islamic character, it would no longer be Europe; it would 
succumb to the onslaught of Islam, which is increasingly violent. Immigration, then, is merely another 
weapon in the war Islam is waging on Europe, a form of invasion that will eventually take control of the 
continent and Islamize it. Progressive Islamization is, in fact, already a reality. It is therefore time for action; 
we must defend ourselves and avoid the ominous fate looming over us: Islamization. The time has come for 
Europe to rouse itself from its lethargy after being numbed by a culture of deceit and "political 
correctness", by the lies spouted by a trendy lefty political, intellectual and media elite that is essentially 
anti-Western, anti-European and anti-Christian to the core. It is this very same elite that is responsible for 
the state of decadence enveloping Europe, an elite that hates everything that Europe stands for, an elite 
that wants to destroy its roots, its identity and is willing to use Islam to achieve this, to the extent of 
establishing a real alliance with this absolute enemy. Islam and the left are involved in a huge conspiracy to 
do away with Europe and the West. The tyranny of the "politically correct" language, what can and cannot 
be said in public, so successfully imposed by the trendy lefty elite, has given wings to this conspiracy. As a 
result, people do not know what is going on and they are afraid to say what they think. But a group of 
leaders has emerged from among the people, working for and on its behalf. They are not afraid and they 
have decided to raise their voices and to fight Islamization. They are the leaders of the "identity-populist" 
movement, Anglada among them. These are the leaders who have decided to rouse the country from its 
sleep, to make the people realize that the "putrid caste of politicians" (Anglada, 2010: 39-62), of 
intellectuals and media are misleading them, manipulating them at will to fuel their own obscure interests, 
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Broadly speaking, this is the message conveyed in Sin mordaza y sin velos. But beyond this apocalyptic 
description of present-day Europe as a victim of growing Islamization, Anglada –or whoever wrote the 
book– also offers a political project revolving around society, a "solution" to the problems and dangers 
identified in the book: "identity populism". 
 
"Identity populism" is merely a euphemism employed repeatedly throughout the book to refer to völkisch 
nationalism and this alone (on the ideology of völkisch nationalism see Mosse, 1961, 1998; Puschner, 2002; 
Stern, 1974). It is odd that a work so committed to "exposing" the lies of "political correctness" has to 
disguise its discourse in a sea of euphemisms. But the explanation for this is simple, notably the situation in 
which the extreme right found itself after World War II, when it was obliged to modify its discourse to make  
it more socially acceptable, particularly when seeking to become integrated in mainstream politics and 
participate in elections. Scratching the surface, however, the key ideas of the classical extreme right 
reappear in Anglada’s text, rooted in the völkisch tradition: the concept of a community based on blood 
and soil —Blut und Boden—, the need for living space or the now notorious Lebensraum, anti-Marxism, a 
backlash against the Enlightenment, a rejection of universalism, a rejection of the party system, populism,  
the defence of the community’s cultural homogeneity, defence of tradition, defence of the traditional 
family against the "excesses" of feminism, etc. 
 
One of the key aspects of this tendency to mask the extreme right’s traditional discourse is the use of the 
"new racism" or "cultural racism" discourse, in which racial terminology has been replaced by a culturalist 
terminology (Balibar, 1991; Stolcke, 1995). Occasionally, however, the text cannot resist succumbing to the 
strength of the tradition of the extreme right, resorting to undeniably racist expressions. Anglada, for 
example, criticizes the ideas propounded by the Lebanese professor Fawaz A. Gerges, accusing him of 
wanting to "do away with our cultural bases", "in the own interests of his race" (Anglada, 2010: 300). But 
this explicitly racist reference is an exception in the book. More commonplace, as noted earlier, is the 
culturalist discourse that avoids any reference to the idea of race. But, as was the case with "classic" racism, 
this discourse radically confounds cultural and biological elements: genetic makeup determines culture. 
And thus it is that biological concepts such as those linked with genetics are used repeatedly and ever so 
easily to refer to cultural issues. We therefore hear Anglada, obviously referring to Islam, contending that 
"'conquest' as the true manifestation of the faith is a wrought-iron element of the DNA of this religion", 
asserting further on that "Muslims are basically warriors and conquerors", something that "is genetically 
entrenched in the very origins of their ideological religion" (Anglada, 2010: 272 and 278). 
 
There can be no doubt that origin is the determining factor of Anglada’s völkisch nationalism; for this 
reason, any cultural aspect that can be identified with a people or nation can be considered a product of its 
genetic inheritance. A community, says Anglada, —once again confounding biological and cultural 
elements— is "a river of blood", clarifying that he means it "in a cultural or anthropological rather than 
racial sense" (Anglada, 2010: 88). How can a community based on blood and descent be understood in a 
cultural sense unless culture itself is conceived as genetically determined? In other words, for Anglada, the 
community is a blood community that, for this very reason, is cultural. This culture is exclusive to this 
people, to this community, because it is transferred genetically rather than on the basis of exchanges with 
other peoples. The underlying notion is that the foundation of a community, a people, is the link between 
parents and children and that this link is inextricably linked to cultural production and, therefore, that the 
conservation of a people’s culture hinges on conservation of its genetic legacy or, in other words, on what 
classical racism terms "its racial purity". A "racially pure" people is, therefore, the sole guarantee of a 
genuine "own" culture. Foreign genetic or cultural contributions represent an undesirable interference in 
the ordinary course of matters; they would undermine the people’s biological and cultural heritage, its 
authenticity, its identity, and its very survival as a people. Therefore, the integration of foreigners —those 







Since peoples have their own identity, one that is the product of a peculiar creative tradition, we 
reject outright the possibility of what some sociologists term "cultural integration". Nobody is 
entitled to impose a specific tradition that is foreign to another people, because we would be 
breaking a natural law (Anglada, 2010: 88). 
 
The main task of any self-respecting people —understood as a blood community— is therefore to preserve 
its cultural —linked with genetic— heritage.  The mixture that can be engendered by contact with other 
peoples should be therefore be avoided at all costs. All peoples should remain isolated from one another as 
much as possible, within their own territory. One people, one nation, one soil. Blood and soil. A people’s 
destiny, defined by its blood, is inextricably linked with the destiny of its soil. All peoples are therefore 
entitled to their own "vital territory" (Anglada, 2010: 90), and they are obliged to defend it because on this 
depends the preservation of their heritage. 
 
From this perspective, immigration upsets the ideal system of strict separation between peoples because it 
causes individuals of different descent and cultures to live on the same territory. Multiculturalism is a crime 
because it threatens the cultural identity of both the immigrant and the autochthonous individual: 
 
Any people with its own identity naturally needs a specific territory in which to develop and 
perpetuate itself, which is why we also reject the notion of "multiculturalism". There is no room for 
contradictory identities on the same soil because in the end one will end up imposing itself on the 
other/s (Anglada, 2010: 88). 
 
Multiculturalism —identified solely as a product of immigration— threatens the ideal image of 
homogeneity, purity and authenticity, of the people, of the community. This is because Anglada believes 
that a people should be culturally homogeneous, as a product of its blood link. Indeed, for Anglada, the 
people he claims to represent is already culturally homogeneous; this is what defines it as a people: "what 
gives meaning to, and explains, the existence of a people is this common background, these religious 
beliefs, and moral values, ethical principles, cultural traditions and customs, which have gradually taken 
shape as a homogeneous and coherent whole" (Anglada, 2010: 86). Accordingly, if the community shares a 
single moral, a single ethic, a tradition, a religion, it should share the same concept of Good and Evil, a same 
idea of what should or should not be done, a same spirit. This is indeed the case.7 Anglada ascribes the 
existence of internal political discrepancies, if any, to alien ideologies introduced in a bid to change the 
people, to make it something it is not. Political parties, therefore, should represent the people and not try 
to change it. Democracy, in this sense, should operate on the basis of values that are specific to the people 
and not on the basis of universal values, which do not exist because each people produces its own through 
"spontaneous generation". Democracy "is not an ideology", Anglada says (2010: 68), it does not champion a 
series of values, but is merely a system of government through which the people governs. Politicians should 
rule according to the dictates of the people and since the people only has one moral —one that Anglada 
believes emanates from natural law, "Christian humanism" and tradition (Anglada, 2010: 103)—, governing 
on behalf of the people means governing in accordance with the principles of this moral. 
 
Democracy, as understood by Anglada, is a somewhat peculiar system. Here we have a form of democracy 
that is "spontaneously generated" by the people and which must incarnate the essence of this people, and 
in which only the real members of the people are entitled to participate, where ideological pluralism is seen 
as something evil and where individual freedom should always be placed at the service of the community, 
without ever transcending the limits imposed by tradition (Anglada, 2010: 122). Understood thus, it is 
hardly surprising that Anglada views "identity populism" as "profoundly democratic" (Anglada, 2010: 81). If 
the people is one and has one sole moral, the existence of political parties does not make much sense. If 
this intrinsic unity is ubiquitous, there should be no disagreements, no discord, and it would be natural for 
just one party to exist. The party that really defends the interests of the people, its traditions and identity,  
 
                                                          
7
 Anglada’s insistence on this idea of total homogeneity is curious, to say the least, considering that his own party was 
internally divided and that this division eventually led to a breakup. 
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that embodies its values and ideas, should be its only and legitimate representative. This sole party 
vocation is evident in PxC: 
 
We have said that a party is an association with an end purpose. Obviously, the end purpose of 
some parties is ideological: they want to change or rebuild society on the basis of a roadmap drawn 
up by some enlightened soul who, in his infinite and prodigious wisdom, has dreamt up a perfect 
society that has never occurred to anybody before him. Since we believe it is only possible to design 
the future through the progress that tradition represents, i.e., the "spontaneous generation" made 
by the people overall, we are not, nor do we want to be, nor can we be, an ideological party. 
Ideological parties divide a single people between those who believe and those who do not share 
these ideas. Our party, Plataforma, on the other hand, is transversal in the sense that we want to 
represent the entire people and not just part of it (Anglada, 2020: 116-117). 
 
 
In other words, it is not just immigrants who are threatening the people and its unity, but also the 
"ideological" parties, especially left-wing ones. These want to change the people, transform it into 
something else, because deep down they hate it. They are anti-Spanish, anti-European and anti-Christian.  
This is why they facilitate immigration, especially Muslim immigration, which is specifically anti-Spanish, 
anti-European and anti-Christian. They are therefore traitors who want to do away with the people; they 
are internal enemies and part of the problem. Their supposedly favourable stand towards Muslim 
immigration makes this clear: 
 
This stupid bonhomie which consists of ushering in those who want to destroy our democracy and 
destroy our community is a betrayal of the nation, a betrayal of the people and an intractable 
paradox on the part of those who call themselves democrats and tolerant, because it is their 
weakness that will bring about the day when democracy and tolerance are things of the past. 
How can they not realize this? Is it not enough for them to see what happened to civilisations that 
were so ahead of their time, such as those of Egypt or Rome?  
The reason is simple. They are not satisfied with the people, they do not feel comfortable within the 
community. They dream and aspire to a people that is different to what we are, they are fighting for 
a community that is different to the one we form, you and I (Anglada, 2010: 91). 
 
 
Anglada, therefore, clearly identifies an internal enemy bent on corrupting "our essence", and an external 
enemy "threatening us" from outside and now, thanks to the "trendy lefty betrayal", also from inside. 
 
 
The Islamic "threat" 
 
Islam, as Anglada makes clear from page one onwards, is the absolute, eternal and essential enemy. If 
Europe has defined itself in counterposition to anything, that anything is Islam. This much is made clear in 
the prologue, written by Heinz-Christian Strache, chairman of the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ): "our 
identities as nations have been forged in the struggle against Islam, acting as real barricades against the 
challenge of the Muslim civilization. Neither Spain nor Austria would be what they are without this 
common characteristic that defines us" (Anglada, 2010: 13-14). 
 
It is in the fight against Islam that Europe, the idea of Europe and its identity, have been built. This essential 
feature of Europe’s identity, however, has been forgotten, concealed by the tyranny of what is considered 
to be "politically correct". Europeans have therefore forgotten what they are, what defines them. They 





penetrated our society, which it is gradually conquering through Islamization. Total Islamization is the 
future awaiting Europe if it fails to react in time. This is the scenario Anglada presents, to which end he 
resorts to the well-known strategy —used also by anti-Semites8— of introducing a futurist panorama where 
this ominous fate is already a reality. The year is 2025; Islam practically dominates everything, a situation 
that has been brought about by respecting the basic rights of Muslims, by allowing them to continue being 
Muslims. They were allowed to open mosques; religious symbols were removed from public institutions; 
Muslims were allowed to continue following their customs; they were allowed to vote and so they voted 
for Islamist parties that want to establish sharia law (Anglada, 2010: 17-19). This is now a reality: 2025, the 
year of final Islamization and it is already too late to do anything about it. But today, with Islamization yet 
to culminate, it is possible to act, and acting means following the ideas of "identity populism", Anglada’s 
ideas. He has the solution. 
 
Before taking action, we must be clear that Islam is effectively an enemy. It is essential to combat the ideas 
established by the tyranny of "political correctness" and make the "real character" of Islam quite clear. 
Anglada prides himself on being "politically incorrect" and daring to say what others keep to themselves 
(Anglada, 2010: 27). He dares to speak the simple truth: Islam, all of it, is the enemy. There is no such thing 
as good Islam. The notion of a moderate Islam is simply "a gross mistake demonstrating the crass ignorance 
of a bunch of know-it-all intellectuals regarding Islam" (Anglada, 2010: 330). All Muslims, as people subject 
to Islam, are the enemy. There is no difference between them. As for those living in Spain, they are "all 
fundamentalists" (Anglada, 2010: 419). All Muslims believe that their religion obliges them to conquer the 
whole world, to Islamize it, since the "mandate of all loyal Muslims who emigrate is to Islamize the ground 
they tread" (Anglada, 2010: 361). Indeed, a perfectly planned strategy has existed "from the very same 
moment the Koran was written: the Islamization of the world, either through conversion or force" 
(Anglada, 2010: 395, original emphasis). As far as international relations between Islamic and non-Islamic 
states are concerned, this translates into an ongoing and inevitable conflict, a clash of civilizations, whose 
existence Anglada does not doubt for a second (Anglada, 2010: 297-300). This same "clash of civilizations" 
is taking place in those European countries that have allowed Muslim immigration (Anglada, 2010: 261-
262). 
 
Muslim immigrants arrive in Europe and they do not change. They hold on to their beliefs, their customs 
and their ideas. They continue to be Muslims and therefore they are still the enemy. They will always place 
the sharia over and above any national laws (Anglada, 2010: 279). And since they are duty-bound to 
Islamize the world by virtue of the sharia, this is exactly what they are doing in Europe: trying to Islamize it. 
The fact is, on settling in our countries, they have not changed their way of thinking, behaving and 
expressing themselves. They still feel the same way and pursue the same aims as in their countries of 
origin, but with the aggravating factor that here they are pressured to extend their beliefs in order to 
"convert us", because, I repeat, Islam is basically an ideological and clearly expansionist religion (Anglada, 
2010: 280). 
 
Immigration is therefore a new form of aggression, a weapon used by Islam in its strategy of conquest, of 
global Islamization, a "Trojan horse" (Anglada, 2010: 277-280). Immigrants, once here, amass in certain 
areas with the clear aim of removing themselves from the authority of the State and replacing this with  
                                                          
8
 See, for example, the picture Louis-Sébastien Mercier (1740-1814) paints for 2440: "The Jews increased almost 
supernaturally, under the contempt of the nations who became so tolerant of them that they finally thought the time 
had come to revive the Mosaic Law and announce it to the world (…). We did not want great bloodshed and this 
people, for its part, were prepared to renew all the horrors that its history offers, and of which it has been the agent 
or the victim. You allowed this ferment which was silently penetrating all the countries of Europe to lie dormant (…). 
Its furore terrified us for it seemed to want no one left alive on the globe except believers attached to Mosaic law (…). 
Decisive action had to be taken to repress the ferocious superstition." (Mercier, 1787: vol. 3, 177-183; cit. in Poliakov, 
1984: 151). 
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sharia law, creating a State within a State (Anglada, 2010: 267-268)9. Thanks to their exponential 
demographic growth and the ageing of the autochthonous European population, these immigrants would 
soon become a majority. They are, in fact, a real demographic threat (Anglada, 2010: 283-285).  
 
Availing themselves of the rights we have so naively granted them, they will then manage to impose 
themselves, take power and Islamize society. The "Islamization of the world" does not correspond to the 
"desire of a specific and radicalized group of Muslims, but is rather a specific and literal mandate handed to 
them by Allah in The Koran", and therefore incumbent on all Muslims who, "to the extent that they are 
believers, cannot shake off this moral obligation". Their diasporas will therefore "fight with all the means 
available to them to replace Christianity and the secular civic values that have shaped European Western 
civilization with sharia law, legitimized by the desire of the divinity" (Anglada, 2010: 414). And all of this is 
encouraged and facilitated by the trendy liberals, who insist on being tolerant. They know what Muslims 
are like and yet they continue to defend the "trendy-lefty theory of multiculturalism", calling for Muslims to 
be respected "in keeping with the democratic tolerance they, these Muslims themselves, lack completely 
and which they arrogantly view with contempt" (Anglada, 2010: 74-75). 
 
Anglada, on the other hand, believes that intolerance should be met with intolerance, "intransigence with 
intransigence" in the case of "those who are endangering democracy". This means intolerance towards  
 
Islam, but also towards other ideologies –such as Marxism– that he does not consider to be democratic 
either (Anglada, 2010: 76, 396)10. So while Islam is the enemy, equally dangerous are those who help it, 
who facilitate its growth, those whose anti-Spanish, anti-European and anti-Christian hatred makes them 
want to see Islam triumph. The left, in this sense, is part of the problem. In its zeal to transform society, to 
turn the people into something else altogether, the left is attacking Christianity and identity populism and  
promoting multiculturalism. Allowing different cultures to live side by side in the same territory and 
undermining the unitary nature of the people is the left’s favourite tool for implementing its 
transformation strategy. This strategy will in time lead to the people’s true identity becoming so blurred 
that nobody will be able to distinguish it, marking a decisive step towards its final transformation. 
Moreover, the introduction of Islam will be a fundamental weapon in this left-wing strategy to place all 
these religions on an equal footing and thus do away with the Christian values underpinning European 
society. This is a new "Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact", an alliance between the trendy left and Islam to do away 




Fabricating the image of the enemy 
 
But how does Anglada go about constructing the image of the Islamic threat? He resorts to two tactics: the 
authority of a series of authors, and the use of the Koran as proof that the threat is real, that the very 
essence of this religion and its sacred text is the origin and cause of the evil Islam embodies. 
 
As far as the first tactic is concerned, Anglada goes out of his way to cite a great many intellectual 
authorities to back up his statements on each page of the book, aiming to give the impression that his 
arguments are well founded. However, hardly any information is ever given regarding the origin of the  
                                                          
9
 Anglada does not use the expression "State within a State", given its obvious anti-Semitic roots, but rather the 
euphemism "subgroup within a country’s legal group", but the meaning is obviously the same. The "State within a 
State" image was an integral part of the European anti-Semitic discourse (see Katz, 1969). 
10
 Following this very same logic, this intolerance could be applied to Anglada himself, given his clear intransigence 
with any attitudes contrary to his own. Meeting "intolerance with intolerance" —a widespread slogan in the 
Islamophobic discourse— is, like "an eye for an eye", the quickest way to make us all blind and eliminate the practice 





sources cited. The aim is clearly to make it difficult to check the veracity of the quotes used, because in 
many cases Anglada’s citations are distorted or simply false. On other occasions, he resorts to blatant 
plagiarism, putting someone else’s words into his own mouth. More often than not, the author’s 
determination to come across as an intellectual force to be reckoned with is pathetic, not least in the light 
of his academic background and political track record. Suffice to say, the book is peppered with Latin, 
English and even Arabic phrases. 
 
Several examples can be cited to demonstrate this spurious use of other authors’ work. When citing the 
words of Jordi Moreras, a lecturer at Rovira i Virgili University and an expert on Islam in Catalonia, Anglada 
says "the term diaspora provides a framework for analysing the processes and strategies developed by the 
different Muslim communities in Europe to preserve and safeguard their collective identity" (Anglada, 
2010: 267). However, for obvious reasons, he avoids quoting the rest of the sentence, as follows: "and 
achieve their satisfactory and non-confrontational integration in European society" (Moreras, 1999: 29). 
Further on, apparently citing ambassador José María Ferré de la Peña word for word, Anglada contends 
that:  
The "majority" trend in present-day Islam is "traditional and fairly intolerant; predominating among 
the most religious" there is another "extremist trend going as far as fanaticism", substantiated by 
"experts on traditional Islam, but interpreted selectively. They legitimize violence and even 
terrorism" (Anglada, 2010: 271, original emphasis). 
 
The original text, in fact, differentiates between four trends within Islam: a majority trend, an extremist 
trend, a liberal trend and a Sufi trend. What Ferré de la Peña actually says is that this extremist trend "goes 
as far as fanaticism, but with very few adherents" (Ferré de la Peña, 2008), a qualifying statement Anglada 
prefers to omit.  
 
This pattern is repeated with a text by Fred Halliday, altered to the extent of becoming almost 
unrecognizable (Anglada, 2010: 357; see Halliday, 2005: 188-189). The same holds true when Anglada cites 
Abul A’la Maududi (Anglada, 2010: 359; Maududi's original text in Elorza, 2002: 200), eliminating his 
references to the Christian theocracy and to the form the Islamic government should take. He also 
eliminates Maududi’s ideas concerning each Muslim’s right to interpret the law of God, since this 
contradicts what Anglada repeats ad nauseam: that the sources of the law cannot be interpreted, that 
there is "no room for argument and they cannot be modified or interpreted on a whim" (Anglada, 2010: 
330). Anglada even goes as far as distorting a text by Daniel Pipes, not exactly a renowned Islamophile. 
Anglada uses this text to legitimize his idea that "Islam is incompatible with democracy", when Pipes clearly 
states that he does not share this idea and that "Islam, like all pre-modern religions is undemocratic in 
spirit. No less than the others, however, it has the potential to evolve in a democratic direction" (Pipes, 
2008; Anglada, 2010: 357). Earlier, Anglada even plagiarized a text by Pipes himself, citing the words of 
Fouad Ajami, Olivier Roy, John Eposito and Leon Hadar taken from an article Pipes wrote, but which is not 
cited anywhere in the book (Pipes, 1995; Anglada, 2010: 327). 
 
This form of using quoted sources is repeated, as expected, when the Koran is cited. As with other 
Islamophobic authors, everything that does not tally with the image of Islam Anglada is trying to project is 
eliminated from the quoted texts. Islam, evil as it is, cannot appear to be diminished. It must come across 
as wicked to the core, so there can be no room for nuances. When, for example, Anglada cites verses 
2:190-191, where God calls on believers to fight on his behalf, he fails to include the proviso at the 
beginning of verse 190, "those who fight you but do not transgress. God does not like transgressors". 
Needless to say, he does not cite the next verse, 192, "And if these cease, then God is forgiving and 
merciful" (Anglada, 2010: 335; for the Spanish original version see El Corán, 2005: 31-32). When he 
reproduces verses 8:17-18 Anglada adds the words "the unbelievers", which are not in the original text. He 
also alters the text of 4:77, and when he cites 8:60, calling on the believers to prepare for war, Anglada fails 
to mention that the next verse also calls on them to accept peace: "If they incline to peace, then incline to 
it also!" (Anglada, 2010: 335-336; El Corán, 2005: 89-90, 178, 183). Even more manipulative is the 
translation of verse 9:5 which Anglada renders as "If they convert, establish prayer and give zakat, leave 
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them be!", when both Julio Cortés’ translation —which Anglada purports to use— and Juan Vernet’s say "if 
they should repent" (Anglada 2010: 336; see El Corán, 2005: 188; El Corán, 2008: 156-157). 
 
Even though Anglada claims to use Cortés’ Spanish translation, he occasionally uses Vernet’s instead —as is 
the case with verses 8:7-8—, but without clarifying this. This is because Cortés uses the words "remove the 
disbelievers", whereas Vernet says "exterminate the disbelievers down to the last man," which Anglada 
doubtless found more appropriate (Anglada, 2010: 334; see El Corán, 2005: 177; El Corán, 2008: 148). 
 
In short, Anglada uses the Koranic text and the texts of the contemporary authors he cites as he sees fit, 
always with the aim of endorsing a pre-established image of Islam. If the text is in line with what he 
considers "true Islam", he cites it verbatim. If this is not the case, if it can be construed as contradicting the 
image he wishes to convey, then he has no qualms about altering the text so that it says what he wants it to 
say. 
 
As with other Islamophobic authors (see Bravo López, 2012: 207-343; Peters, 2006), the Koran is all-
important in terms of serving to characterize Islam as the absolute enemy. In this case, Anglada devotes ten 
pages of his book to citing excerpts from the Koranic text (Anglada, 2010: 333-343). He then goes on to cite 
verses to support some of his arguments (Anglada: 2010: 361-362, 364, 373-376, 378). Needless to say, in 
doing so he is clearly out to demonstrate that everything he says about Islam is confirmed in its sacred 
book. The Koran provides conclusive evidence concerning any doubts that may arise regarding the true 
nature of Islam. If anyone doubts what Anglada has to say, if anyone does not believe that Islam is as he 
portrays it, all they have to do is pick up the Koran, for there they will find everything they need to know: 
 
But there is something that nobody can deny nor hide for much longer from our people. And that is 
to compare all the information I have provided in this chapter with what the Koran literally says, 
and which I have reproduced in the next chapter. You may be surprised to discover the indisputable 
connection between what the Islamists actually do and what the Koran establishes in its pages as 
the "word directly revealed by Allah". Because if the Koran did not exist, there would doubtless be 
no Islamists (Anglada, 2010: 327-328, original emphasis). 
 
 
The mandate of the Koran, then, is clear: "holy war against the unbeliever, only de-escalating with 
complete Islamization of the world" (Anglada, 2010: 347). And since the Koranic text cannot be altered and 
there is only one way of interpreting it —since its teachings "brook no discussion", and "they cannot be 
modified or interpreted on a whim" (Anglada, 2010: 330)—, there is only one Islam. There is no such thing  
as a moderate Islam and a radical Islam; there is just one Islam. It is for this reason, says Anglada, that 
"those who believe we can achieve an Islam of Europe, as something that differs from traditional original 
Islam, are completely missing the point" (Anglada, 2010: 288, original emphasis). Nor is there any such 
thing as a moderate Muslim, just a way of being Muslim, which is why being both Muslim and European is 
impossible, because, as made clear earlier, Muslims are the enemy of Europe and, by definition, by Koranic 




What makes a Muslim Muslim?  
 
Anglada is forever trying to build an essentialist image of Islam, characterized by wickedness, intransigence, 
intolerance, fanaticism and its hunger for conquest. Islam has been thus since the outset and has not 
changed throughout its history. In fact, it cannot change, it is impossible; its very essence makes it the way 
it is: "Can Islam evolve? Absolutely not", says Anglada (2010: 352). The Koran made it thus and forever. So 




exist, there would be no Muslims either, or Islamists: "because if the Koran did not exist, there would 
doubtless be no Islamists" (Anglada, 2010: 328, original emphasis). It is, therefore, their religion that makes 
Muslims a danger. Therein lies the root of all evil. But what would happen if Muslims were to abandon 
Islam? Can Muslims stop being Muslims and thus stop being a danger? 
 
Nowhere is the essential contradiction between the Catholic and völkisch visions more evident than here. 
Whereas Anglada’s entire political project, this "identity populism", is wholly based on classic assumptions 
of völkisch nationalism, his entire vision of the antagonism between Europe and Islam is, for the most part, 
based on the Catholic anti-Islamic tradition. And both conceptions are obviously at odds regarding the 
nature of the Muslim identity. 
 
When Anglada tackles the issue of the origins of Islam, he cannot avoid introducing an explicitly racist 
perspective, because of the völkisch influence. Like the racists of the nineteenth and the first half of the 
twentieth century (Kidd, 2006: 168-202), in certain passages Anglada toys with the notion that religion is a 
product of something pre-existent, something that shapes it: race, or what he specifically calls "the nature 
of the people". He contends that Islam is the product of the Arab people, of its character, its "nature". The 
essence of the Arab people has passed over to Islam and shaped it, making it what it is: an "ideological 
religion" of expansive and violent nature. The "nature of the Arab people" is nomadic and conquering, 
therefore "the osmosis between Arab and Muslim in this sense is indisputable. Islam, then, is Arabic 
culture" (Anglada, 2010: 369). The culturalist discourse commonly followed by the European extreme right 
does not speak of the "Arab race"; it uses instead the terms "nature" and "culture" indiscriminately, the 
reason being that a people’s culture and its genetic legacy —its "nature"— are conceived as inseparable. 
 
From the völkisch perspective, then, the characteristics of Islam are determined by its Arabic origin: "Islam 
is inseparable from the Arab culture. It is anchored in its foundations, its DNA", says Anglada somewhere 
else (Anglada, 2010: 288). In other words, an Arab would possess all the characteristics associated with 
Islam even if he were not a Muslim, even if the Koran had never been written and Islam had never existed. 
In this case, a Christian Arab would not really be Christian: he would behave according to his Arab nature 
and would therefore possess the same characteristics the nature of the Arab people conveyed to Islam. 
Conversely, a person of European descent who converts to Islam can never be a true Muslim because that 
person’s origin, his blood, the blood of his people, would determine his culture, which would in turn 
determine his behaviour, which could never be truly Islamic. The answer to the question "Can a Muslim 
stop being a Muslim?" would therefore be yes, provided he or she is not of Arab origin. A Muslim of 
Persian, Berber or European origin, for example, could relinquish Islam and stop being a danger. An Arab 
Muslim, on the other hand, could never stop being a danger even if he or she were to stop being a Muslim 
and become a Christian. 
 
This logical conclusion, however, which inevitably tallies with the völkisch approach, directly contradicts the 
argument propounded time and time again in the book, influenced by the Catholic vision, which is that 
Christianity and Islam are antithetical and that a Christian and a Muslim, therefore, bear absolutely no 
resemblance, irrespective of their ethnic origin. Consequently, a Christian, even of Arab origin, cannot share 
the same characteristics as a Muslim, even if the latter were of European origin. A Muslim, even if of 
Persian, Berber or European origin, could not free himself of the characteristics associated with Islam 
because these stem from the teachings of the Koran and Muhammad, and these teachings are universal 
because Islam "is a religion that brings together all human beings without distinction" (Anglada, 2010: 345). 
In other words, anyone, irrespective of his or her ethnic origin, can be trapped by these teachings. But can 
they abandon them and stop being Muslims, becoming and being treated instead as equals in European 
societies?  
 
The conceptual chaos that this contradiction between racial and confessional perspectives engenders could 
not be clearer. Anglada describes Islam as an "ideological religion", a "code that is not only religious but 
also moral and political", one that turns Muslims into "basically warlike and conquering beings", a 
"genetically entrenched" condition (Anglada, 2010: 75, 278, our emphasis). Thus they end up subject to 
Islam, like robots blindly following Koranic teachings to the letter, which is why their personal capacity "to 
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decide and discern is negligible" (Anglada, 2010: 351). Those who practice Islam cannot "by any means 
escape from the dictates of the sacred text of that religion" (Anglada, 2010: 332). There is no possible 
alternative: this is what Muslims are like. To be otherwise, they would have to stop being Muslims, 
something they will never do, "because distancing themselves from the verses of the Koran would be 
tantamount to saying they are no longer believers of Islam, which is something they will never do" 
(Anglada, 2010: 332). So they will continue being Muslims and will therefore continue to reject and combat 
democracy; they will try to subvert the system, establish Sharia law and, in short, Islamize us. 
 
Some passages of the book are imbued with determinism, from which it follows that once a Muslim, always 
a Muslim. This overtly biological determinism postulates that Muslims are Muslims because of their 
descent, as demonstrated by the fact that the idea of the existence of a supposed Islamic demographic 
threat is considered (Anglada, 2010: 283-285). This idea presupposes that the Muslim identity is something 
acquired at birth, something that is handed down directly as a result of one’s descent; in other words, 
religious beliefs are inherited, they are determined by blood and they cannot be relinquished. 
 
But from the confessional perspective, a Muslim can stop being a Muslim; he can stop following the 
teachings of Islam. The door is left open to the possibility of change: "Those who do not practice Islam 
naturally cannot be qualified as Islamists". But straight away, in the same sentence, the völkisch perspective 
closes that door again: "although the fact of belonging to that community has shaped their way of thinking, 
just as Christianity shapes ours even if we are not believers, in line with the idea put forward of tradition 
and the spontaneous generation of progress" (Anglada, 2010: 332). Here, their "background", the 
"community", is no longer merely Arab, it is Muslim. The Muslim identity is thus racialized, the conclusion 
being that Muslims can never stop thinking like Muslims, even if they are not believers. Change is not 
possible. 
 
Further on, however, change does appear to be feasible again. The books reads: "(…) for a Muslim to accept 
the Western political model, he would simply have to renounce his faith. And we would then no longer be  
 
speaking of European Muslims but rather ex-Muslims in Europe" (Anglada, 2010: 353). The author goes on 
to cite, approvingly, a number of prominent ex-Muslims such as Ibn Warraq, Farag Foda and Nasr Hamid 
Abu Zayd (Anglada, 2010: 353-354). A Muslim, then, cannot change while he remains a Muslim. The Muslim 
will never accept democracy. This same Muslim will not even share "our" same conception of the human 
being: "Muslims will never accept our way of understanding the human being for the simple reason that it 
is not theirs, that of their tradition" (Anglada, 2010: 355). However, Muslims can apparently stop being 
Muslims, in which case everything changes. Those who abandon Islam have, at the very least, managed "to 
accept the Western political model". Or perhaps not, because they still belong to another culture through 
their descent, their blood… And since democracy and this very same conception of mankind, as perceived 
by Anglada, stems from the "spontaneous generation" of the community with which he identifies —and is 
exclusive to that community— then abandoning Islam would not allow Muslims to share conceptions that 
are not part and parcel of their "culture", of their "nature". Clearly, then, the clash between the Catholic 
and völkisch visions in the book is patent from start to finish. 
 
Sometimes it looks as though an invisible hand has corrected the passages written from the Catholic 
perspective in an attempt to accommodate the völkisch framework, completely disregarding the 
contradictory and absurd nature of the end result. This core contradiction can be glimpsed throughout the 
book, even in the vision of the community Anglada himself identifies with. From the confessional 
perspective, Christianity is considered to be a determining factor in building the identity and way of 
thinking of European nations, but at the same time, from a völkisch perspective, it is argued that for any 
given people —understood as a blood community—, the only acceptable cultural manifestations are those 




to consider Christianity as a religion that has emerged spontaneously in Europe, although Anglada does not 
go that far. And so the contradiction remains intact, seemingly inadvertently. 
 
 
Removing a tumour 
 
After presenting the threat, a solution had to be proposed. In order to do so, however, the contradiction 
that appears throughout the book had to be resolved. If Islam is an absolute evil, if this evil is incarnate in 
every single Muslim, if these Muslims —as per the völkisch viewpoint— are Muslims by birth and can never 
stop being Muslims —even if they stop being believers— then, by allowing Muslim immigration, we would 
be "inoculating, in our very midst, the cancer that could destroy Western civilization" (Anglada, 2010: 272-
273). So if Muslims never change and cannot stop being Muslims, neither can they stop being a threat, a 
"cancer" for "Western civilization". If the cancer is not curable, then the cancerous tumour has to be 
removed. 
 
Conversely, if —in accordance with the Catholic perspective— there was a remedy to the evil Muslims 
represent, if Muslims could change and stop being Muslims, then the cancer could be cured: Muslims 
would simply have to be made to abandon Islam. Was this the solution? 
 
Oriana Fallaci tackled the same question in her last book, but concluded that there was no solution to the 
Islamic "problem" in Europe, because the only option would imply doing away with democracy (Fallaci, 
2005a: 63-67). Anglada, on the other hand, appeared to suggest that if democracy is used as it should be —
government of the people by the people, based only on values rooted in the real and particular tradition of 
the people—, there could be a solution and, moreover, a "democratic" one. What the people want is what 
would be done. This would be democratic by definition, as is everything emanating from the people 
through "spontaneous generation". What is more, since PxC was the only party truly representing the 
people, everything it proposed would be democratic. It was the only party that was democratic and loyal to 
the essence of the people. But what, then, was the solution? 
 
This is where the staunch supporters of "identity populism" would be really disappointed because there is 
no talk of removing the cancerous tumour, no question of expelling all Muslims, as Anglada stated in a 
public speech. As Enrique Ravello himself emphatically stated, "the only solution is to repatriate these 
hordes of immigrants" (Ravello, 2010). However, the solution proposed in the book was far from going to 
these extremes. According to Anglada, Islam had to be set apart from all other religions and subjected to 
specific measures translating into less public subsidies —at least while "discrimination against women" was 
not expressly abandoned—, banning the veil, obliging imams to preach in one of Spain’s official languages, 
and monitoring activities in mosques "to ensure in situ that terrorism was not, under any circumstances, 
being encouraged" (Anglada, 2010: 422-423).  
 
From the perspective of "identity populism", it could be inferred that the presence of "strange cultures" in 
the territory of the community with which Anglada identified undermined its cultural identity and was a 
crime, a threat to its survival; the more so if this presence was Islamic. So how could measures focused on 
controlling Islamic worship be perceived as a solution? Clearly, when the author of the book had to tackle 
the business of coming up with a solution, he doubtless viewed as too extreme the logical conclusions to 
which the völkisch perspective led, because they effectively involved eliminating the Muslim presence in 
Europe. All the measures proposed were explicitly linked with religion, with Islamic worship; none targeted 
the preservation of the ethnocultural integrity of the people with whom Anglada identified, with 
preventing the entry into the country of "persons alien to our culture" (Anglada, 2010: 90), or, needless to 
say, the expulsion of Muslims already resident in the country. Nor did they favour any special 
discrimination against Muslims regarding labour, housing, health, etc., beyond those measures targeting all 
immigrants in general, on the "Spaniards first" principle. So, concerning the treatment that should be 
meted out specifically to Muslims —disregarding their ethnic origin—, the book once again dismisses any 
racial approach, opting instead for a confessional angle, but failing to show even any special missionary 
concern geared to encouraging Muslims to progressively abandon their religion. Rather, the book espouses 
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a model similar to the one practiced in the last decades of Franco’s dictatorship for all religious minorities 






It is a mistake to consider that there is only one type of Islamophobia. And doubly wrong to consider that 
this one type is racist in nature. Different types of Islamophobia exist and they differ according to the 
different contexts in which they appear and the different ideologies of the Islamophobes. Left-wing 
Islamophobia, for example, cannot be construed on equal terms as right-wing Islamophobia. Nor can the 
Islamophobia professed by a Catholic be exactly the same as the Islamophobia professed by a Protestant, 
atheist or neo-pagan. Differences exist even within the extreme right, as this article has made clear. 
 
Anyone with Islamophobic leanings has to reconcile his or her ideas concerning Islam with other ideas that 
are also important to them, ideas about God, the human being, science, the family, social, economic and 
political order, etc. And the type of Islamophobia that emerges will be conditioned by the nature of these 
ideas.  All these different types of Islamophobia coincide in their view of Islam and Muslims as a vital threat 
to the wellbeing —indeed the very survival— of the communities with which they identify. But they differ 
as far as other ideas go, which is why they often differ in their conception of what constitutes the mainstay 
of the Muslim identity. Some consider it to be voluntary, the product of individual beliefs, something that 
can be learnt or relinquished; others view it as involuntary, the product of one’s descent, determined by 
origin, something that can be neither learnt nor relinquished. Others still, perhaps the majority, see it as 
voluntary in theory, but involuntary in practice. Some believe that Muslims can change and become "good", 
others that this change is impossible; and others, again probably a majority, consider theoretically that 
change is possible whereas, in practice, they act as though it were impossible. 
 
This article has shown how two types of Islamophobia, present in the same political sector, have clashed 
and been pitted against one another. Two different conceptions of the human being and society coexisted 
within the same Spanish extreme right political party, one völkisch and the other Catholic, engendering two  
 
different types of Islamophobia. The conflict between these two conceptions finally led to a breakup within 
the party, but before that, it was mirrored in the only book the party leader wrote to advertise his ideas. 
The book attempts to reconcile the two conceptions, but fails miserably, engendering overlaps and 
contradictions that are patent throughout. These contradictions mainly concern the way in which the 
foundations of identity were understood, both the identity of the community the party aspired to 
represent and the Muslim identity. 
 
Tensions and contradictions between these two conceptions loom large throughout the book. Racial and 
confessional conceptions of the Muslim and European identities appear side by side. In the case of the 
former, culture is determined by blood, by one’s origin; in the case of the latter, it is determined by 
religious beliefs. The racial conception zeroes in on origin, which cannot be altered; the confessional 
conception concedes that change is possible. In consequence, the racial conception holds that Muslims can 
never be accepted in the community, whatever they do; but the confessional conception says the opposite 
is true, if Islam is abandoned. The conflict between these two irreconcilable visions of the foundations of 
identity ended up sparking an internal division within the party, between the partisans of the Valkyries and 
those of the Virgin of Montserrat, to revert to Enrique de Diego’s terminology. 
 
Despite this fundamental conflict between two different visions of identity, the vision of Islam conveyed in 
the book is consistent throughout. As regards the overall vision of Islam as a vital threat to the "West", the 





the same description of an intrinsically violent, intolerant, destructive religion, fashioned thus from the 
outset by the teachings of the Koran and Muhammad. For this same reason, Islam is frozen in time, 
incapable of developing or transforming itself. Likewise, all Muslims are characterized as robots, as blind 
and irrational followers of the teachings of the Koran and Muhammad, and therefore as violent and 
intolerant chauvinists bent on dominating the world, subjecting it to their God, Islamizing it. Meanwhile, 
Europe is portrayed as decadent and decaying, as a continent subject to the tyranny of a trendy liberal 
corrupt elite bent on misleading the people and prepared to destroy its roots and identity, to which end it 
has no qualms about selling it to the Islamic enemy, which, thanks to this betrayal, is advancing, imposing 
itself and Islamizing the continent. 
 
In short, what we have here is the same vision of Islam, the same vision of Muslims, but different visions of 
the basic elements that define the Muslim identity: one derived from the völkisch tradition, another 
derived from the Catholic tradition. This is what we find in Anglada’s book. However, if we were to swallow 
the hegemonic discourse contained in studies of Islamophobia and accept that it can only ever be a form of 
racism, then we would only be able to consider Islamophobia as that vision of Islam and Muslims based on 
the völkisch conception. But not only that: we would be incapable of differentiating between one 
conception and another, and incapable of identifying the contradictions that arose when attempts were 
made to reconcile the two. We would think that the entire book only reflects one type of Islamophobia —
the only type that supposedly exists, the racist type—, and that it contains no contradictions as regards the 
conception of the Muslim —and European— identity; and finally, that the book does not point to any 
conflict between two different forms of Islamophobia. As a result, we would be incapable of really 
understanding what this book reflects. In short, the notion that Islamophobia can only ever be a form of 
racism prevents us from analysing the reality of this phenomenon in all its complexity. 
 
As stated in the introduction, this is precisely why Islamophobia must be viewed as a phenomenon 
accommodating different sensibilities, as an attitude that is present in different ideological sectors and 
which can therefore take different forms, some racist and others not. On balance, and as argued by Miles & 
Brown, Rattansi and Bangstad among others, Islamophobia is not a form of racism, although in certain 
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